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Abstract: In his article, "The Hazard of Hidden Interactions: A Reanalysis of Designs in Reaction-
Time Studies on Metaphor," Johan F. Hoorn argues that research designs in empirical literature 
and the psychology of aesthetics often include unanalyzed factors. The nature of these factors may 
be linguistic such as word frequency or lexical ambiguity or technical such as presentation order, 
repeated measures, etc. By not correctly analyzing an experiment, higher-order interactions may 
go unnoticed, while interfering with results. Hoorn reviews a sample of reaction-time experiments 
on metaphors, some of which are considered key studies in the area. Because the quality of an 
argument depends on the quality of the experiment, Hoorn places emphasis on designs and 
statistics. He then discusses the consequences of improper analysis for the theory of metaphor 
processing.  
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Johan F. HOORN  
  




The study of literature attaches much worth to putting theory to the test. In metaphor theory also 
a great deal of experimentation is found, particularly among cognitive psychologists with an 
interest in (literary) language and among literary scholars with an interest in psychological 
methods. Although the experiments may obtain valuable information, much of its value is lost or 
interpreted wrongly by improper use of the statistical tools of analysis. In this article, I explain 
that many experiments that supposedly have a 2x2 design, actually used more factors or factor 
levels, and thus contain a higher-order interaction. For the research question, such interactions 
seem unimportant. They often are resulting from trivial manipulation: The order of presenting the 
stimuli, or the order of using the preferred hand in a reaction-time (RT) choice task. Yet, I will 
point out that higher-order interactions may cast a completely different light on what seems a 
straightforward result.  
The rationale of my article is quite simple. Suppose a group of expert readers is contrasted with 
a group of novices to see whether education improves the understanding of postmodern poetry. It 
turns out that experts find postmodern poems better to comprehend than novices. Of course, 
experts are better educated, and practice facilitates comprehension. However, this interpretation is 
based purely on analysis of a main effect (experts vs. novices). Suppose, however, that the results 
show no difference for sex in novices but do show that female experts comprehend postmodern 
poetry much better than expert men do. It now turns out that comprehensibility only increased for 
expert female readers. In other words, education only facilitates comprehension for women. Men 
stay as stupid as they were. Thus, the interaction between expertise and sex strongly limits the 
generalization that education improves comprehensibility. Naturally, most researchers do not 
neglect the possible effects of such important factors as sex and age. However, less obvious 
factors are ignored all too often, although they may limit findings in quite the same way. It may be 
objected that no matter how refined an analysis is, there is always one extra factor one can come 
up with that limits the external validity of a study. True as this may be, it is not too much asked if 
factors that are explicitly mentioned in the design or that can be derived from it are treated in a 
full factorial model. The suggestion of eclecticism should be avoided.  
The Object: Time Course of Metaphor Processing 
First-order interactions (e.g., education x sex) may modify main effects, but may be modified 
themselves by higher-order interactions (only old, fair-haired expert women comprehend 
postmodern poems better: Education x sex x age x hair x color). In metaphor research, similar 
constellations occur. Gibbs investigated whether the presence or absence (factor 1) of a literal or 
metaphoric context (factor 2) facilitated the literal or metaphoric paraphrases (factor 3) of idioms. 
Glucksberg, Brown, and McGlone (1982) measured the comprehension speed for two different 
idioms (factor 1) in two different story contexts (factor 2) with two different actors (factor 3), and 
two different referents (factor 4) as dramatis personae. However, such designs are not always 
analyzed exhaustively. Nevertheless, the results derived from incomplete analyses count as 
evidence in developing metaphor theory (see Hoffman and Kemper). The question put forth by RT-
studies on metaphor is whether the literal interpretation of a metaphor ("man is a machine") is 
executed before the figurative interpretation. Different from literal expressions ("man is a 
mammal"), metaphors would arouse an "anomalous moment" when the literal stage fails and the 
figurative stage is initiated (for counterevidence, see Hoorn 1997). Therefore, the idea behind 
many reading-time and reaction-time studies is that literal expressions are processed faster than 
metaphors. My aim is to evaluate certain experimental attempts made in this field. It is certainly 
not an exhaustive review nor does it underestimate the theoretical contributions that some of 
these studies make. Obviously, examples also exist of proper analysis in RT-research on 
metaphor. Nonetheless, the following sample shows that uncarefully analyzed designs are not 
uncommon.  
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Examples  
In an illuminating review of the pitfalls of RT-studies on metaphor, Hoffman and Kemper tick off 
hazardous matters such as neglect of subject strategies, task biases, individual differences, and 
natural settings. There may be one more added: Improper analysis of research designs. Ortony, 
Schallert, Reynolds, and Antos (1978) carried out two RT-experiments, in which contexts primed 
the literal or metaphoric meaning of metaphoric and idiomatic expressions. Idioms (e.g., "a pain in 
the neck") are metaphors that have become so conventional that their literal meaning is 
subordinate. In experiment 1, the time was recorded to understand an expression. Context length 
(short vs. long) was compared with prime type (cuing the literal or metaphoric meaning of an 
expression). According to a serial two-stage anomaly model, expressions primed as metaphors 
were supposed to be processed more slowly than those primed as literals. Moreover, it was 
expected that this difference would only occur in short contexts. Longer contexts were supposed to 
provide so many cues, that the relevant stage was evoked directly and, hence, any difference 
would be eliminated. Thus, the seriality of the two-stage model was supposed to be confirmed in 
short contexts, not in long ones. The design combined two lists of expressions, two presentation 
orders and two contexts (short vs. long) as between-subject factors. Literal or metaphoric priming 
was a within-subject factor. Presentation order had no effect, and was excluded from further 
analysis. Unfortunately, a potential effect of expression list was not reported. Analysis of variance 
of the remaining factors indicated that metaphoric interpretations took longer than literal 
interpretations in the short contexts, whereas they took about equal time in the long contexts. So 
far, so good. 
However, Ortony et al. conducted a second experiment in which the manipulation was more 
evasive. Again, the time taken to understand an expression was recorded. Three between-subject 
factors of expression type order (idioms first or last), expression list and presentation order were 
employed in combination with two within-subject factors: Context type (long vs. short) and 
expression type (idioms vs. literal). The between-subject factors proved insignificant, and need not 
concern us here. The numbers of expressions in the two within-subject factors of context type and 
expression type were not counterbalanced, so that the effects were confounded with practice. Two 
stories served as contexts (story A and B), while expressions could be idiomatic or literal. 
However, the idioms were connected to both stories, whereas the literal expressions were 
connected only to story A. Thus, the missing cell was literal expressions in story B. The metaphoric 
or literal priming was also unbalanced. Story A was constructed such that it primed the metaphoric 
meaning of the idioms, and the literal meaning of the literal expressions. Story B, however, only 
primed the literal meaning of the idioms. In other words, apart from prime type, another factor of 
story type should have been devised, so that story A and B would have primed the literal or 
metaphoric meaning of idioms and literal expressions. Another solution would have been to omit 
one of the stories, or to weigh the results of story A as half.  
These studies by Ortony et al. initiated a series of RT-experiments on metaphor and idiom 
processing. For instance, Gibbs (1980) conducted an experiment on idioms ("he's singing a 
different tune"). As mentioned above, idioms are ambiguous stimuli, because they have a literal 
and a metaphoric meaning. The metaphoric meaning has become conventional in the standard 
language, whereas the literal meaning is hardly ever used. Gibbs investigated whether the 
conventional metaphoric meaning was processed faster than the unconventional literal meaning, 
even when the literal meaning was primed by the context. In one subject group, idioms were used 
as prime, which were followed by literal or metaphoric paraphrases of these idioms. In the second 
subject group, idioms were embedded in contexts, cueing either the literal or metaphoric meaning 
of the idiom. Here also, literal or metaphoric paraphrases followed the idioms. To make sure that 
the first group would not interpret the idioms only in their metaphorical sense, the idioms were 
mixed with literal expressions, which also received literal or metaphoric paraphrases. RT was 
registered for true-false decisions after paraphrase presentation. The results suggested that 
conventional (metaphoric) uses of idiom were processed faster than unconventional (literal) uses, 
despite their metaphoric origin and despite priming the literal meaning. To summarize, idioms and 
literal expressions without context preceded paraphrases that could be either literal or metaphoric, 
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and idioms in a literal or metaphoric context preceded paraphrases that could be literal or 
metaphoric. Gibbs analyzed this design as a standard 2x2 of condition (context vs. no-context) 
and paraphrase (literal vs. metaphoric). Yet, the design was a 2x2x2 of condition, paraphrase 
(literal vs. metaphoric), and prime type (literal prime vs. metaphoric prime). To know whether the 
prime type of the contexts was literal or metaphoric, a new group of subjects rated the priming of 
the contexts, whereas the priming of the idioms and literal expressions was not rated. Thus, the 
prime type in no-context might not have been the same as the prime type in context. Yet, they 
were treated as comparable in the design, whereafter only the effects of idioms - not of the literal 
expressions -- were analyzed. Important information was lost concerning idioms with literal primes 
and metaphoric paraphrases, and those with metaphoric primes and literal paraphrases. These 
could have told the power -- within subjects -- of the literal and metaphoric primes in the 
interaction of (condition by) prime type by paraphrase.  
Glucksberg, Gildea, and Bookin (1982) administered a within-subject experiment on metaphors 
and literals in a standard sentence verification task (true/false). Literals could be correct 
("Standard True") or incorrect ("Standard False"); accordingly, metaphors could be correct 
("Metaphors") or incorrect ("Scrambled Metaphors"). The latter can be viewed as instances of 
anomalies. Subjects judged the truth value of the expressions, and the RT from expression onset 
to button press was measured. It was argued that if the figurative meaning of correct metaphors 
can be ignored, 'false' decisions should be equally fast for correct and incorrect metaphors. 
Conversely, if the figurative meaning is accessed automatically, "false" decisions for correct 
metaphors should be slower than for incorrect metaphors, because an extra figurative check is 
needed. It was found that RT for correct literals was fastest -- followed by incorrect literals and 
incorrect metaphors -- whereas correct metaphors were slowest. It seemed that metaphors were 
evaluated on their figurative truth, which is consistent with the two-stage model. Incorrect literals 
and incorrect metaphors were perceived as equally anomalous and could be rejected as not literal. 
However, the study has a number of pitfalls. The number of literals and metaphors were not 
balanced. The correct literal expressions had 80 items, the incorrect 40, the incorrect metaphors 
had 20 items, and the correct metaphors also 20. As indicated above, incorrect literals and 
incorrect metaphors took about an equal time to be rejected as "false." In other words, the 
incorrect expressions may all have been perceived as anomalies. If so, it could be that subjects 
perceived 80 literals, 60 anomalies, and 20 metaphors. This range coincides with the ordinal 
pattern that was found in the mean RTs. Thus, reactions may become slower as expressions 
occurred less frequently. The authors suggested that the semantic relationship between terms was 
probably less strong for metaphors than for literals, so that metaphors were processed more 
slowly. If so, the authors argued, the RT pattern should remain unchanged even in different 
contexts. In experiment 2, expressions were provided with context by introducing the quantifiers 
Some and All. 'Some surgeons are butchers' was supposed to be more plausible than "All surgeons 
are butchers." The more plausible or "correct" metaphors were rated for "goodness," whereas the 
other expression types were not. In the interaction of expression type (literal vs. metaphor) by 
quantifier, the Some metaphors (rated as "good") showed the pattern of experiment 1 that RT for 
correct literals was fastest -- followed by incorrect literals and incorrect metaphors - whereas 
correct metaphors were slowest. The All metaphors (rated as "less good") did not show this 
pattern. Thus, context had effect, and it was inferred that metaphor comprehension was not 
merely a matter of semantic relatedness. This experiment was analyzed as two quantifiers with 
four expression types. The expression types (Standard True, Standard False, Metaphors, 
Scrambled Metaphors) were treated as four independent conditions. Yet, an important interaction 
with correctness was overlooked. Standard True and False are literally correct and incorrect 
expressions. Metaphors and Scrambled Metaphors are figuratively correct and incorrect. Thus, the 
design is a 2x2x2 MANOVA for quantifier by expression type by correctness. Differences attributed 
to expression type may be due to correctness in the interaction. The same is valid for experiment 
3, which duplicated this design and analysis.  
Gildea and Glucksberg (1983) administered three variations on the above study, which 
combined three prime types (literal prime, figurative prime, no-prime) with four expression types 
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(Standard True, Standard False, Metaphors, Scrambled Metaphors). Despite this 3x4 design, 
Standard True and False were not analyzed in experiments Ia, Ib and II, while the remaining 3x2 
was analyzed only by planned comparisons (t-tests). Ib was analyzed in a 2x2 ANOVA, ignoring 
the higher-order interactions outlined earlier.  
Estill and Kemper (1982) surveyed idioms (e.g., "climbing the walls") for effects on RT with 
three cue types and four context types. Subjects were asked to identify the last word ("walls") in 
an expression, given a particular precue. Cues could be words ("walls") identical to the last word in 
the expressions, they could be rhyming ("falls") with the last word or they formed the semantic 
category "'part of a building") of the last word. The idioms appeared in literal, figurative, or 
ambiguous contexts. Expressions that were not idioms but did use the idiom's last word ("knocking 
out the walls") were presented in non-idiomatic contexts. Subjects reacted as soon as the last 
word of an expression was encountered in the context. This 3x4 design was properly analyzed and 
it was found that the main effects of cue type and context type were significant, whereas the 
interactions were not. The Word Identity cue yielded faster responses than the Rhyme cue, which 
was faster than the Semantic Category cue. More importantly, non-idiomatic contexts slowed down 
RT, compared with all other contexts. Thus, the last word was differently processed when it was 
part of an idiom than when it was not. The authors suggested that idioms were processed as 
discrete lexical entries. There is a slight inconvenience, however, concerning the last words of the 
expressions. In the non-idiomatic context, the last word came from an idiom - but was not used in 
an idiom - as opposed to the other contexts. Thus, the stimulus ratios were not counterbalanced, 
because three idioms were contrasted with one non-idiom. This may explain the slower RTs for 
non-idiomatic contexts. Because the argument of automatic access of idiomatic meaning was 
entirely based on this RT-difference, the effects should have been treated more carefully. 
Unfortunately, the authors did not provide the exact p-values for the t-tests on context types. 
However, the definition of the alpha-level is critical for the acceptance of -- in this case -- 
automatic access of idiomatic meaning. Context type had four levels (literal, figurative, 
ambiguous, non-idiomatic), and thus established six related main effects. In other words, the p-
value should not have been tested with alpha =.05, but rather with alpha = 8.33-03. Likewise, if 
the interactions had been significant, three cue types by four context types would have resulted in 
18 related interactions, and should have been tested with alpha = .05 / 18 = 2.77-03.  
Gerrig and Healy (1983) examined within-subject effects of prior and ensuing contexts on 
reading time for metaphors. Metaphors rated as "good" were contrasted with 'bad' metaphors in 
active and passive voice sentences, which coincided with prior and ensuing context: "The train 
followed the parallel ribbons" vs. "The parallel ribbons were followed by the train." Subjects 
pushed a button as soon as they understood the sentence. Only the main effect of context was 
significant, indicating that prior context yielded faster reading times than ensuing contexts, or -- 
as a confounded alternative -- confirming the classic finding that active voices were processed 
faster than passive voices. Each cell in the analysis contained 8 metaphors. However, the 
experiment also employed 16 fillers. In other words, the stimuli were not counterbalanced (32 
metaphors against 16 fillers). Fillers were not rated on potential metaphoricalness, so that their 
effects were unpredictable. Filler effects were not analyzed together with the metaphor effects in a 
(weighted) MANOVA. Because only one random order was used for the stimuli, all subjects 
received stimuli in fixed order, which may easily affect the data. The same applies to the second 
experiment. As indicated by the authors, the manipulation confounded ensuing context with 
passive voice. Therefore, another within-subject design contrasted literals with metaphors in active 
and passive voice. It was argued that if slow reading was induced by passive voices rather than 
ensuing contexts, this effect should equally occur for metaphors and literals. If, on the other hand, 
metaphors increased reading times in passive voice -- whereas literals would remain equal -- the 
effects in experiment 1 could be attributed to ensuing context, not to passive voices. Significant 
interactions between (literal-metaphor) and (active-passive voice) that increased metaphor 
reading times would underscore the idea that ensuing context played a special role in metaphor 
comprehension. Indeed, such a significant interaction was found. However, the authors indicated 
that the literal expressions had shorter sentences than metaphors. They asserted that this might 
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have influenced the relative speed with which literals and metaphors were read, but that this was 
immaterial for their argument. Thus, the main effect of expression type was irrelevant, and only 
the interaction counted. Nonetheless, the significant interaction may not only indicate that reading 
times for metaphors were increased by the ensuing contexts, but also that short sentences 
(literals) canceled the elongating effect of passive voices. If so, the interaction of expression type 
and context is confounded again.  
Inhoff, Lima, and Carroll (1984) verified the results of Ortony et al. with three experiments. In 
experiment 1, short contexts primed either the literal or metaphoric meaning of metaphors, 
whereas in experiment 2, long contexts did. Both experiments also employed unrelated contexts, 
which were inappropriate combinations of context and metaphor. Sentence reading time and total 
viewing time on critical words were measured with an eye tracker. The authors claimed that 
metaphorical meanings were understood as quickly as literal ones in long contexts, but slower in 
short contexts. Stimulus lists were varied between subjects, while related vs. unrelated context 
was varied within subjects. Context could prime the literal or metaphoric meaning. Moreover, short 
and long contexts were compared across experiments. Thus, the complete design was a 2x3x2x2 
MANOVA for experiment by list by relatedness by prime type. Yet, two separate analyses for 
experiment 1 and 2 merely tested three means for the main effects of prime type: Literal vs. 
metaphoric vs. unrelated. The discussion suggested that there was an interaction of prime type 
with context, but without any supporting statistical tests. Additionally, the metaphors were 
presented in the same serial order for each list, so that practice or boredom effects were not 
recognized. Furthermore, the priming effect of literal and metaphoric contexts was scored for the 
appropriate metaphors. However, it was not for the inappropriate ones. Experiment 3 investigated 
the thematic relatedness between context and metaphor on reading time. The short contexts of 
the previous experiments served as the thematically related condition, whereas newly created 
"associated-words" contexts served as the unrelated condition. Prime type was literal or 
metaphoric in both conditions, while expression type could be literal or metaphor. Six lists were a 
between-subject factor, whereas relatedness, prime type and expression type were varied within 
subjects. Thus, the design was a 6x2x2x2 MANOVA for list by relatedness by prime type by 
expression type. Nonetheless, the design was diagnosed as 6 lists by 3 prime types (literal vs. 
metaphoric vs. associated-words) by 2 expression types, and was yet analyzed by 2x2 ANOVAs for 
e.g., prime type (literal vs. metaphoric) versus expression type (literals vs. metaphors).  
Paivio and Clark (1986) explored the importance of imagery and intelligibility for the processing 
time of metaphors. Three prime types were used between subjects: A cue for the A-term (topic or 
tenor) a cue for the B-term (vehicle or image), and no cue. Metaphors were scored within subjects 
for the imagery value of the A-term, of the B-term, and for the intelligibility of the metaphor. 
Subsequently, these metaphors were orthogonally distributed over high or low A-term imagery, B-
term imagery, and intelligibility. Subjects read the metaphors after the presentation of a prime, 
and released a button when they were ready to paraphrase the metaphor. In principle, this is a 
3x2x2x2 MANOVA for prime type by A-term imagery by B-term imagery by intelligibility. Yet, 
prime type was analyzed as a main effect of three individual means, separately from the three 
scale factors, which were analyzed as a second-order interaction. The main effect of prime type 
was only significant with stimuli as random factor, so that it was merely an idiosyncrasy of the 
subject group. The authors noticed that the results were paradoxical. Because the B-term is the 
image in which the A-term is perceived, B-term imagery should be and actually was a stronger 
correlate of metaphor comprehension time than A-term imagery. However, the expected 
superiority of priming the B-term over priming the A-term or no priming did not appear. This result 
seems curious, given the fact that the third-order interaction was never analyzed.  
Janus and Bever (1985) also verified the results of Ortony et al. Literal contexts primed literal 
meanings, whereas metaphoric contexts primed metaphoric meanings of idioms. The time was 
measured that subjects indicated that the idiom was understood. RT was slower for metaphoric 
than for literal meaning, which was interpreted as support for the two-stage anomaly model. 
Nonetheless, idioms are ambiguous expression types. Actually, they consist of two expression 
types, i.e., a literal expression and a metaphor, which are easily activated by the appropriate 
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context. The authors indicated that the idioms in the metaphoric contexts were consistently judged 
as less predictable than the idioms in the literal contexts. They attributed this effect to the literal 
meaning of the idioms. However, it was overlooked that the metaphoric meaning was 
systematically correlated with one set of texts, whereas the literal meaning was systematically 
correlated with another set of texts. In other words, because they used two different text sets to 
prime one of the meanings, they could not determine whether the effects were due to divergent 
idiom meaning or to different success in priming. 
Glucksberg, Brown, and McGlone (1993) studied whether conceptual analogies motivated the 
use and comprehension of idioms in discourse. Two reading time experiments were performed, in 
which two contexts were combined with two idiom types. Contexts indicated which person (S or C) 
in the story was the referent of the idiom. The idioms differed for their consistency with the stories 
(consistent vs. inconsistent). Subjects read the stories for comprehension and indicated that they 
finished reading by pressing a key. However, the actual manipulation looked differently. Their 
Appendix B lists two different contexts, two different idioms ("blew top" vs. "bit head off"), two 
different actors ("S blew top" -- "S bit head off" vs. "C blew top" -- "C bit head off") and two 
different referents ("S blew S's top" -- "S bit C's head off" vs. "C blew C's top" -- "C bit S's head 
off"). Obviously, this is not the 2x2 ANOVA that the authors suggested, but rather a 2x2x2x2 
MANOVA of context, idiom, actor and referent. Moreover, context 1 was systematically correlated 
with the combination SS and SC, whereas context 2 was systematically correlated with CC and CS. 
Thus, the reading time effects for context by idiom were biased by the systematically correlated 
interaction with actors and referents.  
Johnson (1996) contrasted metaphors and similes on comprehension speed for priming 
sentences. He also recorded the response speed for verifying the appropriateness of target 
sentences. The assumption was that similes ("deserts are like ovens") take an extra cognitive 
operation to transform them into metaphors again ("deserts are ovens"), so that process time for 
similes should increase. Two similarly designed experiments were conducted. In the first 
experiment, three groups of subjects were exposed to a counterbalanced mix (within subjects) of 
three prime types (similes, metaphors, and literals), which were followed by two target types 
(matching or mismatching the prime). Dependent of the prime, targets were similes or metaphors. 
Literal primes served as distractor or filler items. In experiment 1, subjects decided between 
"logical" or "illogical prime-target combination"; in experiment 2 between "yes" or "no appropriate 
prime-target combination." The time from prime onset to continuation-key press supposedly 
reflected prime-comprehension time, while target onset to decision-key press would indicate 
context-verification time. It was found that metaphoric primes were comprehended significantly 
faster than simile primes (experiment 1 and 2), although this effect differed significantly per group 
(experiment 1). For both dependent variables, the design was analyzed with a 3x2x2 repeated 
measures ANOVA of group (I, II, III) by prime type (simile vs. metaphor) by target type (match 
vs. mismatch). Note that although the experiments were almost identical, there was an effect of 
experiment with group. Yet, experiment was not treated as an extra factor. Additionally, the 
effects of literal expressions in contrast to similes merely were visually inspected in the discussion. 
Strangely, the target types were included into the analysis of prime-comprehension time although 
the effects of backward priming were not under investigation. Thus, in analyzing prime-
comprehension time, the complete design was a 2x3x3 MANOVA for experiment (1 vs. 2) by group 
by prime type (simile vs. metaphor vs. literal). Regarding context-verification time, a 2x3x3x2 
MANOVA of experiment by group by prime type by target type should have been performed. 
Moreover, F2-analysis with stimuli as the random factor (see Clark, 1973) was not administered 
(in multivariate designs, quasi-F would be in place). Bonferroni correction to avoid alpha-level 
inflation was ignored (see Neter, Wasserman, and Kutner 1990, 160-62, 579-89) and in 
misreading Cohen, magnitudes of .20 and .34 were presented as large effect sizes instead of small 
(Cohen considers ES= .20 a small, ES= .50 an average, and ES= .80 a large effect). Put 
differently, probably none of the reported effects can be considered reliable.  
Gentner and Wolff (1997) pointed out the interesting difference between two types of metaphor 
models: Abstraction-first and alignment-first. In the metaphor "my job is a jail," abstraction-first 
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models presume that an abstraction (e.g., "confinement") is derived from "jail" and projected onto 
"job." By matching "confinement" with the representation of "job," the metaphor is verified. 
Alignment-first models assume that metaphors are understood by the intersection of features and 
relations between "job" and "jail." Thus, nonidentical features may be connected by fitting 
relations. Within-subjects, four types of priming stimuli were used. In the both condition, both 
"job" and "jail" were present in the metaphor; in the base condition, only "jail" was present; in the 
target condition, only 'job' was present, and in the blank condition, both terms missed. Four 
between-subject groups were used to counterbalance the assignment of metaphors to conditions. 
Each subject received all 32 metaphors in random order. After the prime, the complete metaphor 
was presented and subjects started typing an interpretation. Because abstraction-first models 
assume that subjects start with interpreting the base, the base condition should yield faster 
comprehension times than the target condition. Alignment-first would predict that seeing both 
base and target should be faster than all other conditions. In experiment 1, interpretation time 
was measured as the time to begin typing the interpretation after stimulus onset. In experiment 2, 
subjects pressed the spacebar before starting to type. Moreover, the inter-stimulus-interval (ISI) 
was increased. Evidence was found for the alignment-first model, because seeing both terms first 
led to the fastest interpretation times. However, this is also the condition that supplies most 
information altogether, so that any information theory would predict the same facilitation. 
Further, the within-subjects factor of prime type had four levels (both, base, target, blank). The 
four between-subjects groups had different blocks of stimuli (four times eight). Only if no 
interactions of group by prime type can be expected, this design may be analyzed by a one-way 
repeated measures ANOVA. In experiment 2, however, the authors also were concerned with 
increasing ISI and the way interpretation speed should be measured. Moreover, the blank 
condition utilized the word "something" instead of blanks. Yet, no interactions with experiments 
were calculated to test these concerns. Therefore, the complete design was not a one-way ANOVA, 
but a 2x4x4 MANOVA of experiment (1 vs. 2) by subject group (1-4) by prime type (both, base, 
target, blank). Note that for experiment 1, N= 60 is likely a misprint. The F-distribution for the 
interaction between prime type and subject groups shows that df1= 3 and df2= 117. The value of 
117 is probably based on 3 times (40 minus 1) subjects, so that similar to experiment 2 and 3, N= 
40. Experiment 3 used the same design but different stimuli. Bases were highly conventional, and 
low in relational similarity to the target (subject ratings). This manipulation favored the 
abstraction-first model in that base-primes accelerated interpretation speed more than target 
primes. Yet, again this design was analyzed with a one-way repeated measures ANOVA, whereas 
the complete design was a 4x4 MANOVA of subject group (1-4) by prime type (both, base, target, 
blank). It may even be argued that the effects of stimulus types should have been tested between 
experiments. In experiment 4, metaphors were rated by norm groups for conventionality and 
relational similarity. Interpretation speed was measured for four subject groups in which stimuli 
were counterbalanced (see above). A 2x2x4 analysis of variance was run for conventionality (high 
vs. low) by relational similarity (high vs. low) by prime type (both, base, target, blank). These 
factors were within subjects, so that multiple analysis of variance should have been in place but 
the report is not clear here. Again, the interactions of group by treatment were not examined. 
Luckily, the Bonferroni method of error protection was used to further explore the differences 
implied by the significant interactions. This makes the choice for the Neumann-Keuls procedure in 
the previous three experiments rather odd. In repeated measures with more than three conditions, 
the error variances usually are unequal. In such cases, therefore, the Neumann-Keuls procedure is 
not recommended (see Hsu 1996, 127).  
Discussion  
As a general remark, many studies reviewed above mainly explored the two-stage model with 
idioms. However, idioms are both literal and metaphoric expressions that share the surface form, 
which makes them improper stimuli to test the two-stage model. First, using idioms presupposes 
that the two-stage model is context-dependent, otherwise the manipulation with literal and 
metaphoric primes would be ineffective. Second, any outcome based on idioms is congruous with a 
context-dependent two-stage model. If idioms are fast with literal primes, they were supposedly 
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perceived as a literal expression, so that a second figurative stage was not necessary. If idioms 
are slow in literal contexts, they were perceived as metaphors, so that figurative interference took 
place. If fast in metaphoric contexts, they were metaphors, the figurative stage of which was 
entered immediately. If they are slow in metaphoric contexts, it mainly shows that context was 
unimportant to the two-stage model, because the literal stage was completed before the second 
was initiated. Thus, before including idioms in the stimulus set, it should be demonstrated that the 
two-stage model is sensitive to context. This could be done by crossing purely literal and purely 
metaphoric expressions with literal and metaphoric contexts (an extra level of no-context would be 
even better). If the two-stage model is context-independent, one effect should be significant: A 
main effect of expression type should underscore that literals are always faster than metaphors. If 
the model is context-dependent, the literal context shows that literals are faster than metaphors, 
which effect should change in metaphoric contexts. The direction of the change in the metaphoric 
context is the interesting part. If metaphors are less slow in metaphoric than in literal contexts, 
then indeed there are two stages, the second of which is facilitated by the proper prime. If 
metaphors are as fast as literals in metaphoric contexts, then the two serial stages in literal 
contexts become parallel in metaphoric ones. If metaphors are faster than literals in metaphoric 
contexts, there are not two stages within one process, because either a literal stage or a figurative 
stage was executed, dependent on the context prime. All other patterns are also evidence against 
the two-stage model. Idioms can be used only in combination with purely literal and purely 
metaphoric expressions. They are not suitable to test a metaphor model, because they are 
ambiguous. Idioms may only be used to investigate the conventionality of their literal or 
metaphoric meaning. Dependent of the pattern they follow in literal and metaphoric contexts, they 
may be processed as literal or metaphoric expressions and pass through one or more stages. If 
they behave as literal expressions, idioms have become conventional uses of figurative meaning. If 
they behave like metaphors (perhaps in metaphoric contexts), the conventional use is affected by 
figurative interference. Similes (comparisons with the preposition like) are a more suitable 
expression type (see Johnson, 1996). In contrast with metaphors (A is B), the preposition (A is 
like B) may immediately launch the figurative or relation stage, so that the fixed seriality of stages 
is limited by the linguistic indicator like. In that case, decisions for literal expressions in simile 
version ("the sun is like a star") should be more confusing and should take longer than normal. 
Decision errors for literals and anomalies with the preposition should be directed to "metaphor" 
more than without.  
To enable theoretical conclusions, I think that, apart from using similes, literals and metaphors 
ought to be contrasted with anomalies. Anomalies set apart the first stage (literal interpretation) 
from the second (figurative interpretation). A serial two-stage model predicts that literal 
expressions yield fast processing times. If the expression is not literal, it is an anomaly 
(intermediate processing times). If the expression is literal nor anomalous, it is a metaphor (slow 
processing times). The introduction of a third expression type induces a major problem, namely 
the choice of choice task. If the three expression types are tested in combination, a 3-choice task 
(literal-metaphor-anomaly) causes difficulties that are not found in a 2-choice task, in that 
subjects may decide to ignore one option and concentrate on the other two. A 2-choice task for 
three decisions requires three experimental runs: L-M, L-A, M-A. In that case, metaphors may be 
faster or slower simply as an effect of the combination with literals or anomalies, whereas they 
would not if they were accompanied by literals and anomalies, as in the 3-choice task. Moreover, 
three 2-choice tasks repeat stimuli, whereas the 3-choice task does not. If repetition affects 
processing time, the 2-choice tasks may fail to show evidence for the model, whereas the 3-choice 
task does. Either kind of choice task is arbitrary. The results of an experiment may be fully limited 
to the specific design. Choice task should be treated as a factor in the analysis. Metaphor research 
has devoted a great deal of attention to context effects, which requires a baseline condition of no-
context. However, little attention has been paid to the effects of condition order (presenting 
context before no-context or vice versa). The same applies to the order of choice task (3-choice 
before 2-choice and vice versa). When repeated presentation infringes on metaphor processing (1-
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trial learning), any model should be discharged from an overall claim on the time relations, or it 
may simply be that RTs are not the best means to investigate them.  
In this article, I tried to evaluate reaction-time studies into metaphor processing on the use of 
research design and statistics. I am afraid that most of the results are not too reliable, owing to 
design artifacts and careless analysis. In the discussion, I also argued that similes and anomalies 
(together with literals and metaphors) rather than idioms should be exploited to examine the 
metaphor models. Ultimately, we should not be over-optimistic about what is known about the 
time aspects of metaphor processing. Much has yet to be learned. Exactly because metaphor 
processing seems such a delicate matter, precise evaluation of the designs and statistics in 
metaphor research is not just a drill in methodological hair-splitting. The metaphor models 
structure the mental chronometry of figurative information processing, which probably is a highly 
sensitive operation. It could easily be wiped out by effects of repetition, order of presentation or 
choice task. From these observations, it follows that many of the RT-experiments on metaphor are 
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